

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON**

TYRONE REID,

Petitioner, : Case No. 3:05-cv-326

District Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

- v -

ERNIE L. MOORE, Warden :
Respondent.

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY ON
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT**

This habeas corpus case is before the Court on remand from the Sixth Circuit to determine if Petitioner should be permitted to proceed on appeal *in forma pauperis* and whether he should be granted a certificate of appealability (Doc. No. 57). Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee for an appeal and presumably seeks to appeal *in forma pauperis*.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires that all district courts in the Circuit determine, in all cases where the appellant seeks to proceed *in forma pauperis*, whether the appeal is frivolous. *Floyd v. United States Postal Service*, 105 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 1997).

28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”

Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this Court, but that determination is not conclusive, since the appeal involves a separate proceeding. *Slack v. McDaniel*, 120 S. Ct. 1595

(2000); *Spruill v. Temple Baptist Church*, 141 F.2d 137, 138 (D.C. Cir.1944). If the party was permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis* in the district court, the party may proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization unless the district court certifies in writing that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, or the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed as a pauper. See Fed. R.App. P. 24(a)(3). If the district court denies the individual leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, the party may file, within thirty days after service of the district court's decision as prescribed for by Fed. R.App. P. 24(a)(4), a motion with the Court of Appeals for leave to proceed as a pauper on appeal. The party's motion must include a copy of the affidavit filed in the district court and the district court's statement as to its reasons for denying pauper status on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 24(a)(5). *Callihan v. Schneider*, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), holding *Floyd v. United States Postal Service*, 105 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 1997), superseded in part by 1998 amendments to Fed. R.App. P. 24.

The test under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a) for whether an appeal is taken in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Thus an appellant's good faith subjective motivation for appealing is not relevant, but rather whether, objectively speaking, there is any non-frivolous issue to be litigated on appeal. This test will often be difficult to apply in any conclusive manner at the district court level because only a bare notice of appeal is before the District Court; it will often be unable to evaluate the issues appellant intends to raise on appeal because the appellant has no occasion to reveal those issues in a notice of appeal.

A person seeking to appeal an adverse ruling in the district court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus or on a § 2255 motion to vacate must obtain a certificate of appealability before proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §2253 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"), provides in pertinent part:

(c)

(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from--

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

District courts have the power to issue certificates of appealability under the AEDPA in §2254 cases.

Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 105 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 1997); *Hunter v. United States*, 101 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1996)(en banc). Likewise, district courts are to be the initial decisionmakers on certificates of appealability under §2255. *Kincade v. Sparkman*, 117 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997)(adopting analysis in *Lozada v. United States*, 107 F.3d 1011, 1017 (2d Cir. 1997)). Issuance of blanket grants or denials of certificates of appealability is error, particularly if done before the petitioner requests a certificate. *Porterfield v. Bell*, 258 F.3d 484(6th Cir. 2001); *Murphy v. Ohio*, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001).

To obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must show at least that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional right." *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). That is, it must find that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the petitioner's constitutional claims debatable or wrong or because they warrant encouragement to proceed further. *Banks v. Dretke*, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004); *Miller-El*

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). If the district court dismisses the petition on procedural grounds without reaching the constitutional questions, the petitioner must also show that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484. The procedural issue should be decided first so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings. *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 485, citing *Ashwander v. TVA*, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring). The first part of this test is equivalent to making a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, including showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473 at 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000), quoting *Barefoot v. Estelle*, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). The relevant holding in *Slack* is as follows:

[W]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue (and an appeal of the district court's order may be taken) if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

529 U.S. at 478.

The standard is higher than the absence of frivolity required to permit an appeal to proceed *in forma pauperis*. *Id.* at 893.

Obviously the petitioner need not show that he should prevail on the merits... Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'

Id. n.4. *Accord, Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039-1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). A certificate of appealability is not to be issued pro forma or as a matter of course. *Id.* at 1040. Rather, the district and appellate courts must differentiate between those appeals deserving

attention and those which plainly do not. *Id.* A blanket certificate of appealability for all claims is improper, even in a capital case. *Frazier v. Huffman*, 348 F.3d 174 (6th Cir. 2003), *citing Porterfield v. Bell*, 258 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2001).

A certificate of appealability must be obtained before appealing from an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion. *United States v. Hardin*, 481 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2007).

In reviewing Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment, the Magistrate Judge concluded it was a proper Rule 60 motion because it was timely and made claims of error in the Court's original judgment.

- On Petitioner's Issue One, the Magistrate Judge concluded Petitioner had shown no error in the Court's reading of *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995), to the effect that "new" evidence to satisfy the *Schlup* gateway cannot be evidence known but not presented at the time of trial.
- On Issue Two, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner could not refute the District Judge's statement that he had engaged in de novo review of objections to a report and recommendations by claiming to be dissatisfied with the District Judge's explanation.
- On Issue Three, the Magistrate Judge concluded *Lopez v. Wilson*, 426 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2005)(*en banc*), precluded using ineffective assistance of counsel on an application for reopening a direct appeal in Ohio to show cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default.
- On Issue Four, the Magistrate Judge concluded Petitioner was in error in asserting that it had been found that he had failed to exhaust available state court remedies.
- Issue Five merely reiterated the actual innocence claim.
- On Issues Six and Seven, the Magistrate Judge noted that "attorney neglect in another

proceeding is not a basis for granting relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) in this proceeding.”

District Judge Rose adopted these conclusions over Petitioner’s objections and denied the Rule 60(b) motion. Petitioner has not moved for pauper status, nor has he applied for a certificate of appealability. However, considering the conclusions the Court reached on the 60(b) motion, the Magistrate Judge believes none of them are debatable among jurists of reason. Therefore a certificate of appealability should be denied. This Court should further certify to the Court of Appeals that the appeal is frivolous and should not be permitted to proceed without payment of the filing fee.

June 19, 2009.

s/ **Michael R. Merz**
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within ten days after being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), this period is automatically extended to thirteen days (excluding intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) because this Report is being served by one of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D) and may be extended further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. *See United States v. Walters*, 638 F. 2d 947 (6th Cir., 1981); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985).